Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

March 28, 1984

Mr. Charles Waterman
National Intelligence Council
Room 7E47
Headquarters, CIA
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Mr. ~~Waterman~~ Charlie:

This is to remind you that the next meeting of the European Policy Group will convene Tuesday evening, 3 April, at 1830 in the Abshire Room of the International Club. The agenda for the meeting and [redacted] introductory paper are enclosed. STAT

We look forward to seeing you next Tuesday. (Chas did not attend)

Cordially,

[redacted] STAT

European Policy Group

RSVP: 775-3234 or 3245

Enclosures

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EUROPEAN POLICY GROUP

Third Meeting

April 3, 1984

1830	Cocktails
1845	Introductory Remarks "The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence"
	[redacted] STAT
1930	Dinner
2015	General Discussion
2130	Close

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CSIS: EXTENDED DETERRENCE

STAT

March 28, 1984

Why is it "Extended" Deterrence

It is occasionally a useful exercise to think why we use all those familiar adjectives in the jargon of strategy -- what makes the strategy "countervailing"? To whom is the destruction "assured"? Why must the capabilitiy be not merely "hard-target" but also prompt? And, for present purposes, to whom, or where, or against what is the deterence "extended"?

This is legitimately a three-fold question because, in the jargon in question, the deterrence is "extended" in several senses. First, and most obviously, it is extended nationally, for it represents an effort by the United States to extend the credibility of its nuclear power to the protection of other nations -- most relevantly, the European NATO allies of the U.S. It is a tribute to the continuing power of the national idea that while there is considerable debate whether the United States would, or should, or should be permitted to, use nuclear weapons in the defense of, say, Germany, there is practically none about whether the other 49 states would use such weapons for the defense of Alaska.

Second, it is extended geographically. The locales threats against which are to be discouraged are, for the most

part, close to the Soviet Union and remote from the United States. This fact that we seek to extend deterrence over great distances has a significant political consequence: To the degree that forces based in the United States are regarded as unsuitable to carry out the threats implicit in geographically extended deterrence, where are the forces that will be relied on to be based and how, if at all, are the host countries to participate in the decision to use the weapons?

Third, and most fundamentally, extended deterrence purports to promise nuclear retaliation not just for the gravest challenges to the security and even existence of the United States. It goes further, to threaten such retaliation -- or pre-emption -- to discourage attacks that, while serious, pose, or may be thought to pose, less ultimate threat to U.S. interests.

Indeed, the jargon betrays the problem. For to call reliance on the ultimate threat of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on America itself is deterrence <u>simpliciter</u>, while denominating as only "extended" deterrence the making of such threats to deter attacks on America's allies is to assert that there are significant differences in the gravity to the U.S. of the threat posed by such attacks. Such is undoubtedly the case for some threats to some allies, and there are no doubt Americans who would argue that it is case with regard to all threats to all allies. But, at base successful deterrence, like a successful alliance, depends on all concerned -- front-line allies, their more remote partners, and potential attackers -- concluding that

an attack on any part of the alliance is in fact a threat to vital interests of the most powerful ally. In a fundamental sense, the debate over extended deterrence is a debate over collective security, over the degree to which it is literally true, and not merely a pious Cold War formula that an attack on one NATO ally is an attack on each.

Viewed in the light of several dimensions of its extension, the problem of extended deterrence is simply the international and political form of the general problem of credibility of retaliation with potentially suicidal consequences against threats that could fall short of fatal. The power of nuclear weapons and the uncertainty of limiting their use are such that only interests that are in the literal sense vital -- matters of national or cultural existence -- will unquestionably be judged sure to be defended by means that risk that existence. From this perspective the debate over extension of American nuclear deterrence to Europe finds its counterpart in debate over American capacity to deter less than all out attacks on the U.S. itself. The whole debate about the "window of vulnerability" and the significance of the vulnerability of American ICBM silos simply recasts the question of extended deterrence in a nongeographical, non-national context. Just as threats of mutual obliteration may be thought less than adequately credible to deter attacks on America's allies in Europe and elsewhere, so such threats may be thought less than adequate to deter limited attacks on military forces in the United States itself.

The Chronic Crisis of Extended Deterrence

A quick review of the history of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategic and political situation gives some useful perspective on the current debate. There can be no doubt that extended deterrence now faces a crisis. There cannot, however, be much doubt that extended deterrence has always been in the throes of crisis.

The uneasy history of American nuclear guarantees to its overseas allies has gone through several phases. Only in the immediate post-war era, before the first Soviet atom bomb test, have U.S. nuclear forces relative to those of the USSR matched the theoretical requirements of high confidence extended deterrence. For a brief period after the Second World War, the Soviet Union lacked, and was believed by military and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to lack, any serious capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. During that period, when fears of an imminent Soviet attack on Western Europe were greater than they have been at any time since, the U.S. threat to respond to such an attack with nuclear weapons -- though it may well have fallen short in terms of capability because of the limitations on the number and power of the nuclear weapons the United States then possessed -- did not lack for credibility.

That dominance was fleeting. By the early 1950s, following the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States government became acutely conscious of the strains

inherent in relying on a threat to launch a general nuclear attack on the Soviet Union as a response to a Soviet attack on U.S. allies. The declaratory policy of massive retaliation then espoused should in no way obscure the fact that during the Eisenhower Administrations senior American leaders, importantly including the President, had grave doubts about the prudence, effectiveness, and even morality of relying on attacks on Soviet cities and industry -- about all then-current weapons were capable of -- as the primary means of preventing a Soviet assault on Western Europe. Indeed, whatever the public simplifications may have been, the doctrine of massive retaliation itself was not a threat to level Moscow at the first sign of Soviet obstreperousness, but rather a warning that future Soviet aggression along the lines of Korea would find the United States less ready than it had been in 1950 to let the Soviet Union and its proxies define the geographical scope of the contest and the character of weapons used.

The immediate reaction of the U.S. Administration and of the NATO Alliance as a whole to doubts about general nuclear war as a way of defending Europe was to focus on ways to use nuclear weapons in ways that would be more effective militarily and more credible politically. The concept of limited nuclear war, and in particular of using smaller nuclear weapons for militarily decisive intervention in battlefield operations was the response.

The turn to tactical nuclear weapons seems to have had two sources. The first was technological. In the few short years between 1945 and, say, 1954, the United States had gone from an extreme shortfall of weapons relative to targets to a position of nuclear plenty. Large numbers of smaller and far more flexible nuclear weapons were now -- or would soon be -- available. The second impetus was economic. The only alternative, relying on conventional defense, was rejected as too costly for an administration committed to fiscal retrenchment, and politically too troubling for a Europe still less than a decade removed from the destruction of the second world war.

In a sense, TNF has never recovered from the enthusiasm of its early days. Small, "clean" nuclear weapons deployed with units in the field, not at air bases far in the rear, would carry the burden of deterrence and, if necessary, defense. Just how they would be decisive, especially once the Soviets could reply in kind was never fully explained. For a period, however, Western leaders publicly espoused the view (later attributed to rigid Soviet artillery marshals) that nuclear weapons were just big cannon. As Field Marshal Montgomery, then Deputy SAC Europe blithely put it to a meeting in London in 1954,

> With us [at SHAPE] it is no longer: "They may possibly be used." It is very definitely: "They will be used, if we are attacked." In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.

NATO has spent the last 30 years returning to the very question Montgomery was so sure was closed. For the period of hearty confidence that the deployment of large numbers of flexible, tactical nuclear weapons would solve NATO's deterrence problems was remarkably short lived. It did not last even for the time necessary to deploy the new weapons. A series of events brought the doctrine into almost immediate disrepute. Probably the two most important such events were leaked reports of the 1955 Carte Blanche exercise showing the massive German civilian casualties that would accompany use of battlefield nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe and Soviet testing in 1957 of an intercontinental ballistic missile heralding an era (incorrectly thought to be closer than it was) of absolute U.S. vulnerability.

One suspects, however, that the real problem was that Americans had hoped TNF would produce decisive battlefield results at tolerable cost, while Europeans hoped they would set off general escalation. Growing consciousness of what the attempt could do to both partners prompted some quick rethinking.

The response to this crisis (like the response to others) diverged into two schools. One sought to find a way to make the use of nuclear weapons more credible by making it not merely a step to mutual oblivion but a strategically meaningful act -- this largely a response to American vulnerability if

escalation went very far. The second sought a way to make use of nuclear weapons unnecessary -- this approach a product of a conviction that primarily, if not purely, conventional defense was both necessary and possible.

Responses of the first sort included the political effort to devise a nuclear capability that was less exclusively American. This effort took a variety of forms ranging from implementation of "dual key" systems, through proposals to develop and deploy uniquely European nuclear forces under the control of a new NATO structure. (It is unlikely to be entirely coincidental that this was also the era of determined deployment of British and French independent nuclear forces.)

From the American side, one important strain of the response in nuclear doctrine to recognition of Soviet capability against the United States was the articulation of a policy of preparing relatively large-scale but still limited nuclear targetting options. This policy sought to find a set of targets that went beyond battlefield use (which had been recognized to be principally destructive in very Western territory it was to defend) and yet stopped short, and recognizably so, of massive attacks on the Soviet homeland (now recognized as likely to bring down an equivalent Soviet response on the U.S. and therefore of limited credibility).

The second strain of the response to the emergence of Soviet intercontinental forces and recognition of the terrible cost of large-scale use of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe

was increased belief, in the United States at any rate, in the possibility of a conventional defense of Europe. Reinforcing this interest was the view that NATO had previously greatly exaggerated the degree of Soviet conventional advantage and the scale of NATO effort necessary to offset it.

None of these responses to the perceived difficulties of heavy reliance on theater nuclear weapons for NATO deterrence was outstandingly successful. Europeans greeted Sec. McNamara's articulation in 1961 of a U.S. doctrine of controlled strategic nuclear response not with enthusiasm but dismay. For they feared -- or purported to fear -- an American scheme to limit nuclear war to Europe. When it became clearer, as Soviet forces began to match Soviet boasts, that no U.S. counterforce attacks could destroy Soviet ability to retaliate against American cities and industry, American enthusiasm for the idea declined as well.

The efforts to increase credibility by a larger European role in nuclear attacks decisions took concrete form in the MLF idea. That plan foundered on inability to reach a workable scheme for European decision-making. A continent that, for all its common heritage and shared interests, could not agree on a supranational policy on the price of wine, barley and sheep meat (unsurprisingly) found it hard to agree on how to decide on nuclear war -- and eventually Lyndon Johnson lost patience with the attempt.

The effort to build a much stronger conventional capability fared little better. However attractive the idea was

to specialists (mostly Americans) it petered out, despite the problems on the nuclear side, as the immediate threat receded with easing of the Berlin crisis and as the United States found its military energies for conventional forces diverted to Southeast Asia.

The decade of the '60s was not entirely unproductive in shaking NATO's faith in a nuclear deus ex machina. By 1967, NATO was prepared to adopt a new statement of its doctrine. The policy of "flexible response," embodied in MC-14/3, proposed to deter by having forces able to meet aggression at whatever level of violence -- including nuclear weapons -- was necessary, while seeking to contain the scope of the fighting. This was a clear step beyond its predecessor of a decade before that had pledged the Alliance to virtually immediate use of nuclear weapons.

The policy of flexible response has many critics and it lacks intellectual elegance, but it does have some of the important advantages of verbal compromise in a situation where there are no easy ways to reconcile differences of interest and difficulties of action. It preserves the commitment of U.S. nuclear weapons and the uncertainty that must inspire in Soviet calculations, while recognizing the inherent advantages of having a conventional defense adequate at least to delay their use until large-scale conventional defeat has made such attacks necessary.

But the compromise of 1967 by no means terminated the argument. With unquestioned Soviet achievement of parity, with U.S.-Soviet agreement on limited restriction on intercontinental

strategic arms -- but not on theater systems, and with a variety of new tensions in the European-U.S. relationship over economics, Vietnam, oil and the Middle East debate continued over the credibility and extent of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The United States by the Schlesinger doctrine and the countervailing strategy sought to restore doctrinally (and attain operationally) the concept of controlled strategic response articulated by Secretary MacNamara in the early 1960s. Responding to European concerns about an arms control deal being made over their heads and to Soviet deployments indicating a continued interest in being able to make strategic nuclear threats to Western Europe, the Alliance agreed on deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs while simultaneously pressing negotiations to limit such deployment on both sides. (The Alliance may not avoid repeating all its history, but it does learn. The LRTNF debate proceeded in a substantially more realistic political context than the MLF debate.)

Challenges to Flexible Response

But none of these steps has stilled the controversy. Distinguished American spokesmen have joined in questioning the credibility of the U.S. making, not just a massive, but any nuclear response, to a Soviet attack in Europe. In Europe even more than in the United States concern has been aroused at whether reliance on nuclear threats is worth risking the cost making good on such threats would entail.

So the Alliance is turning to a new phase in the seemingly endless debate about extended deterrence. The general directions of criticism of current policy may be summed up in three questions:

1. Isn't there a nuclear alternative to current concepts? Is there not a way to defeat or deter by imposing unacceptable but less than total costs, some new way either doctrinally or operationally to use nuclear weapons that will ease the problems of credibility, effectiveness and destructiveness that have undermined past reliance on nuclear weapons?

2. Isn't there a conventional alternative? Is there some way not to rely on nuclear weapons at all or at least not very much, by creating a situation in which there is no need for threats of nuclear escalation because NATO can defeat a Soviet assault by direct conventional defense?

3. Isn't there some political way out, a way to avoid relying on American nuclear weapons but to rely on European ones instead. So far this possibility of a European deterrent remains by far the least discussed of the three possibilities and, as probably the most remote, it is not discussed further here. But in the long run the outcome of persisting unassuaged doubts about relying on American nuclear weapons could well be, not massive European rallying to Alliance conventional defense, but growth in European nuclear forces, with all the attendant political problems of such forces.

Nuclear Changes

Those who seek a different, but still nuclear, way of working the problem have advanced a variety of proposals for changing the weapons and nuclear doctrines on which NATO relies.

One element of this approach urges the need, in place of heavy reliance on battlefield nuclear weapons, to plan to use long-range nuclear weapons to disrupt, inhibit, and prevent the massing and echeloning of Soviet forces well behind the front, and to destroy the airbases, supply systems, and command and control on which the Soviet onslaught would depend. Of course, NATO has always maintained that it stands prepared to strike behind the front line, but now this school of thought argues that, with improved target acquisition capabilities, it becomes possible to do a great deal more in this area. Because this approach tends to focus on targets in Eastern Europe between the Elbe and the Vistula it threatens to arouse all of the traditional European fears about counting on fighting a nuclear war in Europe only. Nor is it self evident that the Pact is significantly more vulnerable to deep strike nuclear attacks than NATO, if only because of NATO's heavy reliance on airpower (and hence on airfields). Massive U.S. reinforcement of NATO's conventional defense presents a variety of targets (airfields, seaports, and POMCUS bases) for limited nuclear attack which are, in their way, every bit as tempting as those Soviet tank formations are supposed to be for NATO.

A second and related approach may be termed a policy of "no early first use." Without renouncing nuclear escalation altogether (or hoping to find the long-sought Grail of a militarily decisive target set for nuclear weapons) it is argued that NATO should take a series of steps to insure that such a decision can be postponed as long as possible and made by political, not military decision-makers. An important element in this approach would pull NATO's nuclear weapons back, both literally from the inner German border and figuratively from immediate battlefield missions. The LRTNF decision fits conceptually very well with this approach, for Pershing IIs and GLCMs are more survivable and are optimized for deep strikes.

Proponents of this view hold that, with that deployment under way, NATO can and should substantially reduce its commitment to use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. To symbolize that change in policy and to reduce pressures for early use of nuclear weapons, NATO should, it is argued, retire many nuclear weapons of dubious utility for long-withheld strikes (air defense weapons and ADMs are usually mentioned in this context). Such reduced numbers of artillery shells, short-range missiles as are retained should be pulled well back from the frontier, while dual-use aircraft are transferred back to the conventional battle. The resulting NATO theater nuclear force would be smaller and more survivable, and would embody a doctrine under which nuclear attacks would be reserved (and would be confidently

able to be so reserved) as a means of escalation after conventional defenses failed, not a means to force the result.

In general, the thrust of efforts to ease the present problems by changes in nuclear plans is to propose to shift the nuclear attacks which NATO would threaten away from the battlefront and toward the rear, away from the Federal Republic and its borders with East Germany and back toward Soviet soil and to seek relief from the pressures to use nuclear weapons early by survivability and disengagement of battlefield forces.

Conventional Changes

Often politically, if not conceptually, contrary to these proposals to restructure NATO's nuclear reliance are proposals to get far more serious about conventional defense.

Proposals for improving NATO conventional defense exemplify, to varying degrees, the familiar (but not for that reason necessarily false) arguments for such steps -- that the conventional imbalance is greatly exaggerated, that technology or public support or the inherent advantages of the defense are on NATO's side, that NATO already spends very nearly enough both in money and manpower to mount a formidable conventional defense and that for all these reasons conventional defense along conventional lines is feasible and desirable.

The most orthodox version of this view maintains that modestly greater efforts, modestly more cooperation, and modestly improved weapons can produce quite large enhancements of NATO's

non-nuclear capability. This view -- which may be called a "conventional conventional" approach -- has been advanced with logic, rigor, and conviction (and some measure of success) by moderate Americans for years. Today it is exemplified by General Rogers' call for NATO commitment to four percent increases in defense spending and Bob Komer's plea for a more coalitional approach to alliance defense.

A variety of observers have enlivened the conventional force improvement lobby by suggesting that fundamental new approaches to non-nuclear defense are feasible -- and probably necessary. (Symptomatic of this approach, Neil Kinnock, the new leader of the British Labor Party, stresses that while his party would abjure nuclear threats (even perhaps in retaliation), the alternative strategy on which it would rely, though certainly "non-nuclear," would by no means be "conventional.")

Prominent in this category are those who argue that "emerging technologies" offer ways to use the West's scientific and technological skill to make up for the shortfalls in more standard conventional forces that have created the present imbalance, and that are likely to persist despite calls for orthodox enhancements. In a sense, the proponents of emerging technologies argue that technology can do for conventional defense what battlefield nuclear weapons were supposed to have done for nuclear defense when they were propounded in the 1950s, namely apply Western skill and inventions, not unattainable numbers, to render the Soviet armored juggernaut ineffective by

high-efficiency, high-leverage attacks on the concentrations which that strategy requires.

Other conventional changes have been advanced that do not rely so much on new inventions as on new thinking and new political attitudes. One is the argument that NATO's effectiveness and its perceived seriousness in conventional defense could be enhanced by the creation of large-scale physical barriers along the inter-German border. Another, and by no means contradictory view, argues that the time has come finally to abandon any suggestion that "forward defense" must be a static defense and rely instead on tactics of maneuver and defense in depth. In its extreme (but by no means self evidently unacceptable) form this emphasis on new tactics includes an argument that NATO should develop the capability to engage in counteroffensives into Eastern European territory. This, it is argued, would frustrate Soviet efforts to concentrate on areas of the front they select and even, by threatening Soviet dominance of the satellites, impose on the Soviets a potential political cost to war of long duration. Other proponents of fundamental departures in the conventional field are also heard, including those who call for a massively increased reliance on reserves and mobilization and on concepts of civilian defense.

It is at least possible that the growing controversy about nuclear weapons in Europe has altered political landscape of the debate over increased conventional defense. In the past, European resistance to significantly increased emphasis on

conventional defense was at least as much political as economic. Conventional defense was seen not merely as costing more money, but as, either literally or figuratively, allowing (or inviting) the United States to leave Europe. With increasing recognition of the potential costs and risks to Europe of excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, Europeans, particularly those of the moderate left, may be becoming more willing to recognize that they, even more than the United States, have a self interest in a more credible conventional defense.

Clearly, these proposals for improving conventional defense offer considerable potential. Nonetheless, serious problems remain with a largely or exclusively conventional defense. The emerging technologies are still emerging; even if only modest increases are required in budgets, they are not necessarily going to be forthcoming; both barriers and maneuver present political difficulties for West Germany and its already strained politics of security.

Proposals for stronger, even exclusively, conventional defense fail, in too many instances, to confront how very great the conventional defense problem is. Better conventional defenses could discourage quick limited scale attacks intended to obtain large gains cheaply (if indeed the Soviets think such attacks are feasible anyway). They could buy time and add uncertainty. If, however, one sets the task as a conventional defense good against a prolonged and determined Soviet assault, one has to cope with the fact that whether or not the Soviets

would be good at a blitzkreig, Russians have long been very good at attrition. Current official Soviet doctrine, in its quest for the daring offensive breakthrough, is not an exemplification but a repudiation of Russian history. Historically, Russia has won wars by the gradual massing of numbers and by willingness to take terrible losses until those masses can grind down a possibly more sophisticated but less numerous or less determined foe. Quite possibly, official Soviet enthusiasm for quick victories reflects a judgment that in the long run the costs of being a modern Kutuzov are too high, but NATO can hardly afford to count on that.

No First Use?

Accompanying some calls for greater conventional efforts -- though by no means logically necessary to them -- are proposals whereby NATO would pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. Many advocates of such a "no first use" posture would delay its declaration and implementation until there had been substantial improvements in conventional forces, but there is a strain in the no first use argument which suggests that the pledge should precede rather than follow such improvements. For it is argued that first use would be militarily ineffective, that it is blatantly incredible, and that the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe has come to produce not solidarity but divisiveness in the Alliance. In any case it is claimed that a threat to use nuclear weapons first

perpetuates the myth that nuclear weapons are panacea for NATO's problems and thereby encourages evasion of those non-nuclear force improvements that are feasible and needed.

It is, however, extremely debatable whether a no first use pledge would help in any way in the process of enhancing either trans-Atlantic unity or conventional defense. The commitment of nuclear weapons is a manifestation, and an important one, of American solidarity with Europe. Revoking that commitment pledge might or might not be believed by the Russians -- or the European left -- but there is every reason to believe it would gravely trouble Europeans who take the Alliance seriously. In the record so far, there is no reason at all to believe that an American no first use pledge would either so calm European concerns about nuclear war as to foster a joint commitment (joined in by the bulk of the nuclear opposition) to vastly enhanced conventional defense.

Discussion of this issue should also cope with the inherent arrogance of assuming that the question of first use is essentially a subject for Western debate. Soviet doctrine in this as in all things is obscure, but there is a good deal of sense to the notion that the Soviet Union regards the prompt neutralizing of NATO's nuclear capability as its priority task in any attack on Western Europe. The possibility that, to carry out this mission, the Soviet Union would at a very early stage use nuclear weapons if only against NATO's nuclear capabilities can hardly be ignored.

Alliance politics and Soviet plans aside, the traditional arguments for including an ultimate nuclear threat continue to have validity. Militarily, the possibility that the Allies will use nuclear weapons against mass Soviet conventional forces must impact on Soviet judgments as to the feasibility of massing sufficiently for the conventional breakthrough their doctrine requires. In time perhaps those concentrations will be as vulnerable to conventional assault as to nuclear, but there is little reason to believe that time has yet come.

Most fundamentally, it is hard to see how a no first use pledge, if it is to any degree believed, could avoid reducing Soviet uncertainty as to the consequences of aggression, and thereby increasing their willingness to try. Moreover, the possibility of first use plays a unique role in whatever hope there may be of containing a war in Europe once started.

The Soviet Union, in deciding whether to embark on a course of aggression that threatens NATO's vital interests -- the freedom and independence of the democracies of the Alliance -- could not mistake NATO's capacity to deny them any fruits of victory by using its nuclear arsenal. They could only mistake our will to use that capacity. The objective of deterrence is to ensure that there is the minimum possible chance that they should make that mistake.

We must, however, force ourselves to consider the possibility that, under the pressure perhaps of some now unforeseeable crisis internal or foreign, the Soviet leaders would, having

persuaded themselves of a good chance of initial conventional success, estimate -- or perhaps, misestimate -- as tolerably low the chances of successful NATO conventional defense and the risk of nuclear escalation, if that defense fails. So self-persuaded, they might then launch an attack.

Thereafter, the point could come at which NATO's conventional defenses began to fail. Then the Alliance would have the greatest possible need for a means to convince the Soviet Union, even in so disastrous a situation, that it had mistaken NATO's resolve, that it should pull back and reassess the prospects.

If having failed in efforts to defeat the attack directly, if the Alliance could not somehow force a Soviet recomputation of likely losses against attainable gains, it would be faced finally with only two awful choices. Those choices would be acquiescence in Soviet military conquest or unleashing the full power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Each one of these choices seems self evidently intolerable -- until the full and true consequences of the other are taken into account.

The potential of limited nuclear attacks to force that recalculation is, arguably, their chief contribution to deterrence and the principal justification for maintaining the capacity for the first use of nuclear weapons, and declaring the willingness, to undertake it. For such attacks -- whatever their direct military effect (and that effect could be substantial, though far from decisive in a traditional military sense) --

would serve to show to the Soviets in the most direct and concrete way possible that the West, and specifically the United States, was in fact prepared to use the means that it had to prevent an end it could not tolerate.

No one can responsibly be confident that such an effort to compel restraint and retreat would be successful. The confusion, even hysteria, that would follow (and indeed precede) such an attack might well drive both sides further and further toward the abyss, not persuade them to draw back. But there is a chance -- and some would rate it a high chance -- that faced with absolute proof of NATO's will to use nuclear weapons by their actual use on a limited scale, the Soviet Union would pull back and terminate the war on terms acceptable to the West.

That is a chance worth retaining, and if only for that reason, a no first use pledge is a bad idea.

A Five-Point Program

To say, however, that NATO should not abandon the possibility of initiating the use of nuclear weapons and that the basic policy of flexible response remains an appropriate one, is by no means to say that there should be no changes in Western tactical and theater nuclear weapon deployments, plans, and doctrines. In addition to pressing for whatever can be done to increase conventional capability, the following measures should be implemented in consultation with all the NATO allies:

-- Significant numbers of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are for the obsolescent Nike-Hurcles defense missiles and for ADMs. These amount to almost 20% of the total. (See table attached.) Neither system is politically workable or militarily effective. In particular, reliance on ADMs should be replaced by efforts to secure agreement to the construction of significant passive barriers along the inner-German border. Removal of these weapons, in addition to whatever symbolic value it would have, would free for more useful military tasks the personnel and facilities needed for their storage and protection.

-- A role remains for battlefield nuclear weapons, but they should be pulled back significantly from the frontier. This would reduce pressures (or perceptions that there would be such pressures) for unnecessarily early release or delegation of authority to use such weapons. Obviously, Soviet proposals to create a "nuclear free zone" embracing virtually the whole of the Federal Republic are unacceptable, but there is a serious political or military case for pulling the battlefield weapons back far enough to give reasonable confidence that their advanced presence would not become a complication rather than a help in the event of attack. Concommitantly, NATO should increase the survivability of the command and control structure necessary for decisions on and imployment of theater nuclear weapons.

-- Except for the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles now being deployed, most NATO theater nuclear weapons are '60s vintage. Clearly, improvements and

modernization will be required, although the inherent controversiality of any such measures has made Western European governments unusually skittish on the subject. The focus of modernization should be on survivable, dedicated, relatively long-range systems. They should be survivable (which includes reduced reliance on air bases) to faciliate a policy of insuring that the decision to use nuclear weapons could be delayed until it was clear that such use was necessary to forestall conventional collapse, and not accelerated out of a fear of Soviet premption. They should be dedicated, i.e., not dual capable, to avoid the political, arms control, and most important, military complications of forces being withheld or diverted for nuclear roles when they could make a crucial contribution to conventional defense. They should be relatively long-range so they could be used in strikes whose military objective, apart from demonstrating NATO resolve, would be to disrupt the Soviet rear not affect the immediate battle, which would, by hypothesis, be taking place on the West side of the inner-German border.

-- Finally, within the policy of flexible response, NATO should move toward the formal articulation of a policy of enhancing its conventional capability and configuring its nuclear capability so as to make clear that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be able to be deferred for a significant time. While NATO should formally reserve all its options, including battlefield use, declaratory policy should explicitly embrace the

concept that initial use might be directed well behind the battlefront, and even onto Soviet territory.

In an ultimate sense, however, the credibility of extended deterrence depends not on the details of forces or doctrine even with respect to so fundamental a question as no first use, but on the basic recognition that extending America's nuclear commitments to Europe does not, in fact, really involve the attempt to push nuclear deterrence beyond the limits of truly vital American interests. The United States is committed to the security and integrity of Western Europe not because the independence of Western Europe from Soviet domination serve European interests but because it is vital to the independence of the United States. Only as long as that proposition is both true and perceived to be true can extended deterrence work, and as long as it is so perceived, extended deterrence can continue to work.

The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

Approximate numbers of warheads for medium- and short-range arms.

LAND-BASED

	U.S.	U.S. forces in Europe	NATO forces	Pacific
Medium-Range:				
Aerial bombs	1,210	1,415	320	135
Pershing I missile		195	100	
Short-Range:				
8-inch artillery rounds	200	505	430	65
155-mm. artillery rounds	160	595	140	30
Lance missile	210	325	370	
Surface-to-surface guided missile designed to provide general battlefield fire support for an Army corps.				
Honest John missile	100		200	
Simple surface-to-surface free-flight rocket that has the accuracy of standard artillery. Being replaced by Lance missile.				
Defensive:				
Nike Hercules missile	55	300	390	
Surface-to-air guided missile.				
Atomic land mines	215	370 /3705	/1950	20

NAVAL /5655

	U.S.	At sea	Europe	Pacific
Aerial bombs		720		
Depth bombs	560	45	190	100
Terrier missile	155	135		
Surface-to-air antiaircraft missile for shipboard use.				
Asroc antisubmarine weapon	225	350		
All-weather, day or night, ship-launched ballistic missile aboard destroyers and some cruisers and frigates.				
Subroc antisubmarine weapon	110	175		
Submarine-launched missile.				

Source: Defense Department